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PREMARITAL CONSENT TO WAIVER OF
SPOUSAL PENSION BENEFITS: A
PROPOSAL TO EQUALIZE PRENUPTIAL
"I DO" AND POSTNUPTIAL "I DO"
INTRODUCTION
Pension regulation has rapidly become one of the most com-
plex areas of federal legislation. Congress enacted the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 19741 (ERISA) to protect
pensioners 2 and to implement uniform federal law governing
pensions.3 In order to maintain federal control of all pension
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988). In enacting ERISA, the House Committee
on Education and Labor found that ERISA's "most important purpose [is]
to assure American workers that they may look forward, with anticipation,
to a retirement with financial security and dignity, and without fear that this
period of life will be lacking in the necessities to sustain them as human
beings within our society." H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4646.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988). Several important reasons exist for national
uniformity in the field of pension regulation. One commentator summarized
key reasons for national uniformity.
The proliferation of multiple-employer and multiple-state pension
plans undermines arguments for state-level flexibility and experi-
mentation, and heightens those for uniform standards for reasons
of both fairness and efficiency. Moreover, the retirement security
of American workers has been a matter of paramount federal
concern since the Social Security Act of 1935 .... When the
federal government promulgates detailed regulations rather than
minimum standard regulations, the case for exclusive federal reg-
ulation is stronger.
Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the
Second Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace,
62 FoRDH~m L. REv. 469, 544 (1993). For a discussion tracing the evolution
of ERISA from early pension plans at the turn of the century to the present
see Camilla E. Watson, Broken Promises Revisited: The Window of Vulner-
ability for Surviving Spouses Under ERISA, 76 IowA L. REv. 431 (1991).
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matters, ERISA contains a broad preemption clause. 4 The sweep-
ing preemption clause allows ERISA to supersede state laws that
have even loose connections to employee benefit plans.' An
expansive reading of ERISA's preemption clause gave federal
pension laws priority over a wide range of state laws in areas
that ERISA was not sufficiently detailed to control. 6
While ERISA was considered a major advance for American
workers, 7 as enacted it contained several unforeseen flaws.'
Specifically, ERISA unintentionally disadvantaged women in two
ways. First, in their capacity as pensioners, women rarely ac-
cumulated the pension levels of men because of their disparate
work patterns. Second, upon divorce, women rarely received
recognition for their contribution to a pension in their role as
the wage earner's spouse.9 ERISA's sweeping preemption clause
defeated any protection afforded women by state divorce laws
relating to pension funds. 10
Congress enacted the Retirement Equity Act of 1984" (REA)
after recognizing that pension law is affected by some state
4. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). See infra note 41 and
accompanying text (discussing ERISA's preemption clause).
5. See, e.g., Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981)
(holding that ERISA preempted state law reducing pension benefits by the
amount of workers' compensation awards); see also part I.B (discussing
ERISA's preemption doctrine). For a thorough analysis of ERISA's preemption
clause see William J. Kilberg & Paul D. Inman, Observations, Preemption of
State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans: An Analysis of ERISA Section
514, 62 TEx. L. Rnv. 1313 (1984).
6. See infra notes 47-59 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA's
ineffectiveness to manage property settlement upon divorce).
7. "At the time of its passage, ERISA was greeted as the most important
social employment legislation ever enacted in the United States." David
Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective
Federalism, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 427, 437 n.19 (1987). See also Watson, supra
note 3, at 434-35 (discussing ERISA's effect on the American labor force).
8. See discussion infra part I.B; see also Leon E. Irish and Harrison J.
Cohen, ERISA Preemption: Judicial Flexibility and Statutory Rigidity, 19 U.
MlCII. J.L. REF. 109 (1985) (discussing judicial and legislative problems
associated with ERISA's broad preemption language).
9. See infra part I.C (discussing ERISA's failure to adequately protect
the interest of women).
10. See, e.g., Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 932 (N.D. Cal. 1978),
aff'd 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting the well established nature of state
regulation of community property), cert. denied sub nom. Seafarers Int'l
Union, Pacific District-Pacific Maritime Assoc. Pension Plan v. Stone, 453
U.S. 922 (1981). See infra part II (discussing the application of ERISA to
family law matters). For further discussion of state regulation of family law
matters see infra notes 49-61.
11. Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1433 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1025,
1052-56, 1144 (1988)). See infra part I.C for further discussion of the REA.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/5
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domestic relations laws, but that ERISA was not equipped to
replace traditional state control of these matters.12 With the
REA, Congress amended ERISA in two major ways. 3 First, the
REA excepted from ERISA's broad preemption clause 4 certain
matters of domestic relations law. Second, the REA required
joint and survivor annuities to better meet the needs of pen-
sioners and their spouses. 5 Although the REA corrected some
inadequacies of federal pension law, the REA was only the first
step in fulfilling Congress' goal of equality in retirement laws.' 6
While Congress amended ERISA's flawed pension laws to
improve the lot of married and divorced women, Congress failed
to similarly provide for women entering marriage. Changes in
the modern American family prompted Congress to create joint
and survivor annuity benefits in REA 7 and provisions that allow
spouses to waive these benefits. 8 These changes though have
also made prenuptial planning more common, particularly among
those entering second marriages and those with children from
previous relationships.' 9 Attempts to waive pension benefits
through premarital financial planning, however, have met with
varied success. 20 Because most prenuptial agreements do not fit
12. One of the act's proponents stated that the REA "is designed to
improve the treatment of women under private pension plans. Inequities exist
under present law which disadvantage both women as workers and women as
surviving spouses. This bill represents the bipartisan efforts of many Members
to make pension plans more responsive to the special needs of women." 130
CoNG. Ruc. 13,325 (1984) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski). For a more
detailed discussion of the REA and its application to women see infra part
I.C.
See infra parts I.B-.C (discussing ERISA's shortfalls with respect to
domestic law issues and Congress' attempt to redress ERISA's shortfalls).
13. See infra part I.C (discussing the REA).
14. See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (discussing the creation
of the qualified domestic relations order exception to the preemption clause).
15. See infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text (discussing the creation
of joint and survivor annuity benefits).
16. One of the stated goals of the REA was to provide for "greater equity
under private pension plans for workers and their spouses . . . ." Retirement
Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1025, 1052-56, 1144 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
17. See infra notes 60-71 and accompanying text (discussing congressional
intent in the enactment of the REA); infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text
(describing joint and survivor annuities).
18. See infra notes 72-79 (discussing the waiver provisions of the REA).
19. J. Thomas Oldham, Premarital Contracts are Now Enforceable Unless
. 21 Hous. L. Rav. 757, 757-58 (1984) (commenting that, due to uncertainty
surrounding the financial ramifications of divorce and the increased likelihood
of divorce in modem times, more couples use marital or premarital agree-
ments).
20. See infra parts II and III (discussing attempts by participants and their
spouses to distribute plan benefits premaritally).
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neatly within the congressionally-specified waiver requirements,
courts often refuse to let these agreements waive congressionally-
mandated benefits. 2' Consequently, although Congress meant
well when it enacted the REA, the survivor annuity requirements
it mandated have actually frustrated pensioners' family financial
planning.22
This Note discusses the effectiveness of prenuptial agreements
as waivers to pension benefits. In order to update ERISA to
address the problems of the modern family and to fulfill the
REA's goal of equitable pension laws, this Note proposes a
change to ERISA as modified by the REA. Part I discusses
ERISA's preemption of state domestic relations law, premarital
agreements, and the REA's amendments to ERISA. Part II
discusses judicial interpretation of the REA's provision regarding
waivers of pension benefits. Part III examines problems with
the current legislation. Part IV suggests amending ERISA to
allow couples to use prenuptial agreements to waive pension
benefits.
I. PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS AND ERISA
A. Prenuptial Agreements
Traditionally, courts struck down premarital agreements, hold-
ing that they encouraged divorce or were void as against public
policy.23 Courts scrutinized premarital contracts more closely
than other contracts because the parties' confidential relationship
made them particularly susceptible to fraud or duress. 24 Pri-
marily, courts were concerned that the wife would not receive
fair treatment because she was the weaker party to the contractY
21. See infra part II (discussing judicial responses to premarital distribution
of benefits).
22. Despite the popularity of the changes in the REA, some critics have
noted the deficiencies in the changes. One critic cautioned, "[t]hat the popular
press and some rights organizations deem [the REA] a major advance for the
non-employee spouse may simply work to unreasonably inflate the expectations
of the non-employee spouse." William M. Troyan, Pension Evaluation In
Light of The Retirement Equity Act of 1984, 11 Faro. L. Rep. (BNA), at
3005 (March 19, 1985).
23. LENORE J. WETzMAN, Tim MARRuAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES, LOVERS
AND Tm LAW 338 (1981). Traditionally, contracts between husband and wife
were considered impossible because husband and wife were a single entity. Id.
24. Id. at 344-45.
25. Id. at 346.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/5
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This heightened scrutiny by courts produced special requirements
for enforceability of prenuptial agreements that are more strict
than the criteria for enforceability of ordinary contracts. 26 These
special criteria included full disclosure of financial status and a
full tmderstanding of the consequences of the agreement. 27
Today, the special criteria for valid prenuptial agreements
vary widely from state to state. At least eighteen states have
adopted all or part of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act
(UPAA).u Some states have specific statutes regulating pren-
uptial agreements" and others include special provisions in gen-
eral statutes regulating agreements.30 Whatever the form, most
state statutes contain a few basic requirements for an enforceable
prenuptial agreement, 31 and all states have laws that adequately
protect parties to a prenuptial agreement.
The UPAA attempts to provide uniform guidelines that con-
form to social policy regarding prenuptial agreements.3 2 The
UPAA allows parties to contract with respect to all present and
future property rights. 33 To protect the parties, the UPAA lists
26. WEITZMAN, supra note 23, at 344-47 (reviewing courts' reactions to
spousal contracts, and discussing concerns about fraud, unconscionability, and
hardship).
27. Id. at 344.
28. U~nu. PREMImTAL AG.EENr ACT, 9B U.L.A. 371 (1983). See ARIz.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-201 to -205 (West Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 9-11-401 to -413 (Michie 1993); CAL. FAm. CODE §§ 1600, 1610-17 (West
1994); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 57213-1 to -11 (Supp. 1992); ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
750, para. 10/1 to /11 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 596.1-.12
(West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-801 to -811 (1988); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, §§ 141 to 151 (West Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2-
601 to -610 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 123A.010-.100 (1991); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 37:2-31 to -41 (West Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52B-1 to -11
(1987); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-03.1-01 to -09 (1991); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 108.700-.740 (1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-17-1 to -11 (1988); S.D. COD-
nqED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-2-16 to -25 (1992); TEX. Fm. CODE ANN. §§ 5.41-.56
(West 1993); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-147 to -155 (Michie 1990).
29. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 301 (1993); LA. Cry. CODE ANN.
art. 2328 (West 1985); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 460:2-a (1992); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-3-501 (1991); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1(b) (Supp. 1994).
30. See; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.16.250 (West Supp. 1994); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 767.255(11) (West 1993).
31. See Oldham, supra note 19, at 762-65. Generally, enforceable premar-
ital agreements must be in writing; must not be procured through fraud or
duress; must be made intelligently after adequate disclosure; must not en-
courage divorce; and must be made in exchange for consideration (marriage
generally satisfies the consideration requirement). Id. at 762-65. But see UNru.
PREMAIT. AGREEMENT ACT § 2, 9B U.L.A. 372 (1983) (stating that a
premarital agreement is enforceable without consideration).
32. Ukm. PREMART AGREEMENT ACT Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 369
(1983).
33. Section 3 of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act provides: "(a)
19951
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the instances in which an agreement will be unenforceable. These
instances include when an agreement has been involuntarily
executed, when an agreement is unconscionable, and when the
parties unfairly or unreasonably fail to disclose their financial
status.34
An increasing number of second marriages has caused a rise
in the number of couples using prenuptial agreements." Couples
often use prenuptial agreements to secure the inheritance rights
of children from previous relationships.3 6 Additionally, couples
use these agreements to simplify matters in the event of divorce
and to provide couples security during marriage.37 Accordingly,
a state court should enforce a prenuptial agreement unless the
court determines that the agreement fails to meet a minimum
standard of fairness.39
Parties to a premarital agreement may contract with respect to: (1) the rights
and obligations of each of the parties in any of the property of either or both
of them whenever and wherever acquired or located." UNWI. PREMARITAL
AGREEMENT ACT § 3, 9B U.L.A. 373 (1983).
34. Section 6 of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act provides:
(a) A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against
whom enforcement is sought proves that: (1) that party did not
execute the agreement voluntarily; or (2) the agreement was un-
conscionable when it was executed and, before execution of the
agreement, that party: (i) was not provided a fair and reasonable
disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other
party; (ii) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any
right to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the
other party beyond the disclosure provided; and (iii) did not have,
or reasonably could have had, an adequate knowledge of the
property or financial obligations of the other party.
UNiT. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1983).
35. WEITZMAN, supra note 23, at 37.
36. Oldham, supra note 19, at 757.
37. Id. at 760 (noting that rising divorce rates and an increase in the
number of working women have made judges more amenable to prenuptial
agreements).
38.
Society has an interest in ensuring that both spouses have adequate
means of support after a divorce. Such a result minimizes the
friction and trauma of the divorce process and enables both
spouses to continue to lead productive lives. If the divorce settle-
ment provides both spouses with adequate support, then society
has no interest in trying to alter the settlement agreed to by the
parties.... Because spouses presumably rely upon the provisions
in marital agreements, an agreement should be considered unen-
forceable only when there is a compelling public policy reason to
do so.
Oldham, supra note 19, at 777.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/5
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B. ERISA Preemption Doctrine
Congress enacted ERISA to replace inadequate and varying
state regulation of employee benefit plans.3 9 Therefore, Congress
included a clause preempting any state law "relat[ing] to" a
qualified employee benefit plan to prevent states from regulating
such plans.40 Congress recognized, however, that state control
of some related fields would not hinder effective federal control
of retirement plans.4 1 Thus, Congress excepted from preemption
state laws regulating insurance, banking, and securities. 42 Apart
from regulation of these specifically excepted industries, Con-
gress intended ERISA to broadly preempt all state laws "re-
lat[ing] to" employee benefit plans.4 3
ERISA has proved troublesome for courts interpreting the
preemption clause. The U.S. Supreme Court indicated that some
matters may be too tangential to employee benefit plans to
require federal preemption." The Court has been reluctant,
39. The purpose of ERISA is:
to protect . . . the interests of participants in employee benefit
plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and
reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other
information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of
conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee
benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanc-
tions, and ready access to the Federal courts.
ERISA § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988).
40. ERISA section 514 provides that ERISA: "shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section
1003(b) of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
41. Congress intended "to preempt state law sweepingly, as a general
matter, and then to carve out exceptions as special problems or special interests
present themselves." Kilberg & Inman, supra note 5, at 1314-15, n.5. There-
fore, "[i]f it is determined that the preemption policy devised has the effect
of precluding essential legislation at either the State or Federal level, appro-
priate modifications can be made." 120 Cong. Rec. 29,942 (1974) (statement
of Sen. Javits).
42. The "savings clause" provides: "[E]xcept as provided in subparagraph
(B), nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any
person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or
securities." ERISA § 514 (b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp.
1993).
43. "It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the
bill the substantive and enforcement provisions ... are intended to preempt
the field . . . ." 120 Cong. Rec. 29,933 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams).
44. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983). "Some state actions
may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote or peripheral a
manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan." Id. at 100
n.21. Overly broad preemption could create other problems. "If ERISA
preempted all state law relating to employee benefit plans, a dangerous vacuum
1995]
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however, to explain specifically which state laws "relate to"
ERISA and which do not.45 Thus, with little specific guidance
on how to interpret the ERISA preemption clause, lower courts
have employed various approaches.
Several courts interpreted ERISA's "relate to" clause nar-
rowly with respect to the traditionally state-regulated area of
domestic relations law. In Stone v. Stone,46 for example, the
court faced the possibility of federal interference with this
traditionally state-regulated area. In Stone, a plan participant's
ex-wife attempted to use her divorce decree to obtain a portion
of her ex-husband's plan benefits. 47 However, court action to
would result. Progressive state legislation would be frustrated, and Congress
might not fill the void with the necessary federal legislation. Major problem
areas in employment law could be left unaddressed." Gregory, supra note 7,
at 457.
45. "In the past eleven years, the Supreme Court has decided eleven
ERISA preemption cases." Drummonds, supra note 3, at 524 n. 309. See
District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 113 S. Ct. 580 (1992)
(District of Columbia statute requiring health insurance for injured employees
preempted); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990) (state
wrongful discharge claim preempted because alleged discharge was based on
employer evasion of pension obligations); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S.
52 (1990) (state motor vehicle code preempted); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490
U.S. 107 (1989) (state law requiring employers to pay discharged employees
for their unused vacation time was not preempted); Mackey v. Lanier Collec-
tion Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988) (garnishment statute preempted
because it singled out ERISA plans); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482
U.S. 1 (1987) (state severance pay statute not preempted); Pilot Life Ins. Co.
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (state common law action for improper claim
processing preempted); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58
(1987) (state common law contract and tort suits to recover benefits pre-
empted); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985)
(state insurance law mandating minimum benefits not preempted); Shaw v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (state law forbidding discrimination
in benefit plans preempted); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S.
504 (1981) (state statute reducing benefits by amount of prior workers com-
pensation awards not preempted).
In 1992, Justice Stevens stated that there were approximately 2800 ERISA
preemption cases pending in the federal courts. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade,
113 S. Ct. at 586 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Despite the proliferation of
ERISA preemption cases the Court stated: "[W]e express no views about
where it would be appropriate to draw the line." Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21.
46. 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978) aff'd 632 F.2d 740, (9th Cir. 1980)
cert. denied sub nom, Seafarers Int'l Union, Pacific District-Pacific Maritime
Assoc. Pension Plan v. Stone, 453 U.S. 922 (1981).
47. Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. at 921. In Stone, the participant's wife
obtained a divorce decree awarding her 40% of her ex-husband's pension
representing her community property interest. When the participant refused
to comply with the decree, the wife filed a suit in state court to compel him
to comply with the terms of the divorce. The pension plan removed the case
to federal court. Id. at 920.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/5
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force the plan administrator to distribute the plan benefits to
the ex-spouse violated ERISA's prohibition against alienation. 41
Recognizing the strong history of state control over domestic
relations law, as well as its tenuous relationship to pension law,
the court denied federal preemption.4 9 Instead, the court applied
state community property laws and enforced the divorce decree.5 0
In American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Merry,-" the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit similarly denied ERISA
preemption of a state alimony order distributing pension bene-
fitS. 2 The Merry court determined that the alimony order was
within the state's police power. The court reasoned that basic
state police powers are not properly preempted unless Congress
clearly intended to preempt them. 3 The Merry and Stone courts
both relied on a history of state regulation in the field of
domestic relations. Accordingly, both denied ERISA preemption
by narrowly reading ERISA's "relate to" provision.14
Although affirming traditional state control in the domestic
relations area seems equitable, the Merry and Stone courts'
narrow reading of the "relate to" language was contrary to
congressional intent." When it enacted ERISA, Congress de-
48. The anti-alienation clause provides: "Each pension plan shall provide
that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated."
ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1) (1988).
49. Stone, 450 F. Supp. at 932. The court applied the presumption that
federal law does not preempt a state's historic police powers. Id. (citing Ray
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 434 U.S. 151, 157 (1978)). Without clear evidence
that Congress intended to preempt state community property laws, the court
refused to find ERISA preemption. Id. The court also noted that "Itihe
intended beneficiaries of the California community property laws would be
placed at a . . . disadvantage by preemption [because it] would deprive non-
employee spouses of the share in marital assets which they indirectly helped
to acquire ... " Id. at 932-33.
50. Stone, 450 F.Supp. at 932.
51. 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979). In Merry, the participant's ex-wife
obtained a garnishment order to collect unpaid support payments. The pension
plan trustees sought a declaratory judgement to discover whether they could
pay the participant's pension benefits to the ex-wife. Id. at 120.
52. The court stated that "[a] garnishment order used to satisfy court
ordered family support payments is impliedly excepted from preempted state
law relating 'to any employee benefit plan."' Merry, 592 F.2d at 121 (quoting
ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
53. Merry, 592 F.2d at 122. The Merry court denied preemption due to a
"fundamental principle of statutory interpretation ... that the basic police
powers of the States, particularly the regulation of domestic relations, are not
superseded . .. unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."
Id. (quoting Carteledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146, 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
54. Merry, 592 F.2d at 121-22; Stone, 450 F.Supp. at 931-33.
55. The result appears to be equitable because the courts honored state
decrees, recognizing that ERISA was not written to deal with matters related
19951
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scribed the broad preemption language as ERISA's "crowning
achievement. ' 5 6 Congress intended the broad preemption clause
to prevent state laws from eroding federal control of pensions."
Clear congressional intent for broad preemption made it difficult
for the Merry and Stone courts to justify their contrary conclu-
sions. The courts denied preemption notwithstanding the broad
preemption clause because they found that ERISA was less
adequate than state law to regulate certain domestic relations
matters.5"
C. The Retirement Equity Act
Concerned that ERISA inadequately responded to family is-
sues, Congress enacted the REA to incorporate into ERISA the
notion that marriage is an "economic partnership" and to more
effectively address pensions as a marital asset.59 Although the
to postmarital distribution of assets. See, Merry, supra. The courts, however,
were forced to use a restricted reading of the "relate to" language that defies
specific congressional intent regarding the breadth of the "relate to" clause.
Kilberg & Inman, supra note 5, at 1315-16 (observing that while Congress
intended to assume the regulatory field, it excepted state regulation of the
insurance, banking and securities industries from preemption because it did
not want to remove state power to control those industries).
56. 120 Cong. Rec. 29,197 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dent).
57. Kilberg & Inman, supra note 5, at 1316 (identifying Section 514 as an
"[e]xpress preemption provision").
Kilberg and Inman distinguish express preemption provisions and implied
preemption provisions as follows:
To strike down a state law in an implied preemption case, the
court must find ... a specific conflict between federal and state
commands.... The goal of an implicit preemption analysis should
be to accommodate the federal interest with the least possible
displacement of state law. The goals of an express preemption
analysis, in contrast, should be to prevent subtle or incremental
state encroachment into a field that Congress has chosen expressly
to reserve for federal law.
Id. at 1316. See also, Nonm~A J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CON-
STRuCTION § 47.24 (5th ed. 1992) (discussing the use of norms of statutory
construction to distinguish express and implied statutory provisions).
58. See Stone, 450 F. Supp. at 921.
59. 130 CONG. RiEc. 13,316-17 (1984) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski).
Congresswoman Ferraro explained the concept of "economic partnership"
that REA addresses as follows:
[the REAl establishes two principles that I consider fundamental:
That the partner in a marriage has earned a stake in the fruits of
that marriage, one of these being a pension; and that once a
worker has become vested in a plan, neither he nor his spouse
can be arbitrarily deprived of that earned benefit.
130 CONG. Rac. 13,339 (1984).
The Retirement Equity Act of 1984 further sought to:
improve the delivery of retirement benefits and provide for greaterhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/5
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REA is written in gender neutral terms, its primary purpose was
to improve the status of women in federal pension law. 6° Under
ERISA, women often received inadequate pension benefits be-
cause of their work patterns. 6' Prior to the REA, ERISA left
many wives with none of their husbands' pension benefits if
their husbands, often long-time employees, died days, or even
hours before retirement. 62 The number of elderly women living
in poverty by 1984 was a testament to ERISA's inability to
adequately protect the surviving families of plan participants. 63
equity under private pension plans for workers and their spouses
and dependents by taking into account changes in work patterns,
the status of marriage as an economic partnership, and the sub-
stantial contribution to that partnership of spouses who work both
in and outside the home....
S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2547.
60. "If both spouses could be predicted to have substantially equal earnings
and pension savings opportunities, neither spouse would be particularly likely
to need pension support from the other. In conventional marriage patterns,
however, childrearing and homemaking have been women's work, and the
wife so engaged has been cut off from opportunities for doing her own pension
saving." JoHN H. LANOBEIN AND BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE
BENrr LAW 434 (1990) [hereinafter LANGBEIN, PENSIONS].
61. Congressional sponsors of the legislation explained how women as
workers were disadvantaged:
The first problem this legislation addresses is the special work
history of many women. Women tend to enter and leave the work
force more frequently and tend to have longer periods of absence
than men. Historically, wives have had to leave their jobs to
permit family mobility for their husbands. Also, women tend to
have longer absences from the work force in order to care for
young children.
... [The changes in REAl will insure that women, who tend
to enter the work force earlier, will be able to begin earning
pension credits for their service.
130 CONG. REc. 13,325 (1984) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski).
62. Representative Conable told the story of one of the witnesses testifying
before the Committee on Education and Labor as follows:
[One] witness was married 36 years to a repairman in Kentucky
coal mines for 27 years. [sic.] About a month after his fatal heart
attack at age 54 in 1980, his pension fund sent her a letter saying
she would get no widow's benefits because he had died "too
early." Had he lived for only four more hours, she would have
received widow's benefits.
130 CONG. Rc. 13,326 (1984) (statement of Rep. Conable). See also Hernandez
v. Southern Nevada Culinary and Bartenders Pension Trust, 662 F.2d 617
(9th Cir. 1981) (denying spousal benefit to the spouse of an employee with
vested pension rights who opted for survivor annuity benefits but died three
months short of the plan's normal age of retirement).
63. In 1984, women comprised 72% of the elderly living in poverty. 130
CONG. Rac. 13,327 (1984) (statement of Rep. Clay). See also KENNETH
AULETTA, THE UNDERCLASS 68 (1982) (stating that "[p]erhaps the single greatest
change in American poverty is that it has been feminized").
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Congress' goal in enacting the REA, therefore, was two-fold:
to increase the number of women with vested pension rights,
and to provide adequate protection for women as pensioners'
spouses."
The REA attempted to increase the number of women with
vested pension rights by changing the vesting and assignment
requirements of qualified plans.6s The REA, therefore, lowered
the minimum age for participation in a qualified plan from
twenty-five to twenty-one years." The REA further protects
pension rights of women by declining to treat maternity and
paternity leave as a break in service. 67 These changes in partic-
ipation requirements better reflect female work patterns and
equalize treatment of women as pensioners."
64. Congresswoman G6raldine Ferraro indicated the congressional intent
behind the REA when she introduced the legislation that later became REA
and stated: "Women are shortchanged by private pension plans because the
system does not truly recognize the contribution that women make to the
economy or take into. account women's unique work patterns, patterns which
revolve around childrearing and other family responsibilities." Pension Equity
for Women: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations
of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 26
(1983).
65. Retirement Equity Act of 1984 § 102(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1052(a) (1)(A)(i),
(B)(ii), 1053(b)(1)(A) (1988). Congress reduced the minimum age for partici-
pating in a plan from 25 to 21. § 1052(a) (1)(A)(i). Congress also lowered the
age from which years of service are taken into account for determining a
pensioners nonforfeitable percentage from 22 to 18. § 1053(b)(1)(A).
66. Retirement Equity Act of 1984 § 102(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(1)(A)(i)
(1988). By lowering the age at which vesting occurs Congress reflected the
fact that many females entered the workforce earlier than men and then
departed the work force earlier, either following a marriage or to raise a
family. Earlier vesting allowed females to earn credit for those years that
previously went undocumented for plan benefits. See supra note 62 (discussing
the reasons that the change in age minimums for vesting will help women
earn more pension credit).
67. Under ERISA, females who left work for maternity leave were dis-
advantaged in their amount of pension credit by a break in service. ERISA
§ 202, 29 U.S.C. § 1052(b) (1982). The REA amends ERISA by adding:
(5)(A) In the case of each individual who is absent from work
for any period - (i) by reason of the pregnancy of the individual,
(ii) by reason of the birth of a child of the individual, (iii) by
reason of the placement of a child with the individual in connection
with the adoption of such child .... or (iv) for purposes of caring
for such child for a period beginning immediately following such
birth or placement, the plan shall treat as hours of service, solely
for purposes of determining under this subsection whether a 1-
year break in service ... has occurred ... [the employee's nor-
mally credited hours or eight hours per day]
Retirement Equity Act of 1984 § 102(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(b) (1)(E) (1988).
68. The changes give credit to workers who enter the workforce earlier in
life. See supra note 66 (discussing how the changes embodied in REA helpedhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_ rba law/vol47/iss1/5
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The REA also attempted to improve treatment of women as
wives of pensioners. The REA forced plan participants to include
their spouses in decisions about allocating pension benefits in
the event of a divorce or the death of a pensioner. 69 Prior to
the REA, ERISA permitted a plan participant to waive spousal
benefits without the spouse's knowledge or consent.70 Conse-
quently, if the participant died, spouses might be left without
the benefits of the participant's pension. The REA created joint
and survivor annuities mandating payment of benefits to spouses
of retired plan participants. 7' Spouses of participants with vested
rights, who die before retirement, also receive the survivor
benefits .72
women with credit for those entering the work force earlier). Also, the bill
"affords couples an opportunity to begin raising a family without forfeiting
pension credits." 130 CoNG. Rnc. 13,327 (1984) (statement of Rep. Clay).
69. The legislative history of the REA indicates that Congress believed
that a "spouse should be involved in making choices with respect to retirement
income on which the spouse may also rely." S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong. 2d
Sess. 12 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547, 2558. REA Section 103
provides for joint and survivor annuities and preretirement survivor annuities
as follows:
(a) Each pension plan to which this section applies shall provide
that -
(1) in the case of a vested participant who retires under the
plan, the accrued benefit payable to such participant shall be
provided in the form of a qualified joint and survivor annuity,
and
(2) in the case of a vested participant who dies before the
anriuity starting date and who has a surviving spouse, a qualified
preretirement survivor annuity shall be provided to the surviving
spouse of such participant.
REA § 103, 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a) (1988).
The provisions regarding joint and survivor annuities apply only to defined
benefit plans, individual account plans subject to the funding standards of
§ 302, and any other individual account plan unless the plan provides that the
accrued benefit is payable in full on the death of participant to the surviving
spouse. REA § 103(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1055(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
These provisions closely resemble forced share provisions in state estate
law. See generally John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Redesigning
the Spouse's Forced Share, 22 RIAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 303, 304 (1987)
[hereinafter Langbein & Waggoner] (describing a typical "forced share"
provision as an option to a surviving spouse to claim one-third share of the
decedent's estate).
70. During congressional debates on the REA, Rep. Martin recanted the
story of a woman who had called her office overwrought with grief. After
the sudden death of the woman's husband, her husband's former employer
informed her that her husband had inadvertently waived her survivor benefits.
130 CoNG. Rnc. 13,345 (1984) (statement of Rep. Martin).
71. REA § 103, 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a) (1988). See supra note 70 (discussing
this section).
72. 130 CONG. REc. 13,345 (1984) (statement of Rep. LaFalce).
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The REA maintained some flexibility by permitting partici-
pants and their spouses to waive survivor's benefits. 73 Waiver is
only permitted, however, if the spouse of the plan participant
voluntarily relinquishes survivor benefits. 74 The REA set forth
three requirements for a valid waiver of spousal benefits. First,
waivers must be in writing. 75 Second, the waiver must designate
an alternate beneficiary. 76 Finally, the consenting spouse must
acknowledge the effect of an election to waive spousal benefits.
77
By mandating benefit plans that permit waiver of spousal ben-
efits only with spousal consent, the REA provides security for
spouses that did not previously exist under ERISA.
7 8
The REA further sought to maintain flexibility and protect
the wives of pensioners by enacting special rules for assignment
of pension benefits in divorce and similar proceedings . 9 At
divorce, pension benefits frequently constitute a large part of
the marital property. Prior to the REA, property settlements in
divorce proceedings could not distribute pension benefits because
ERISA forbade alienation of benefits. 0 Under the REA, a
73. A participant might want to waive the joint and survivor annuity for
several reasons. One economic reason is that waiving joint and survivor annuity
benefits increases an employee's monthly benefit because the value of the
pension is paid out over the length of one life instead of two. Drummonds,
supra note 3, at 549, n.442.
74. REA § 103(c)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1055(C)(2)(A) (1988). The waiver
provisions provide that:
... [A]n election under paragraph (1)(A)(i) shall not take effect
unless -
(A) the spouse of the participant consents in writing to such
election, the spouse's consent acknowledges the effect of such





78. In 1984, while ERISA governed pension distribution, "[o]nly 5 to 10
percent of surviving spouses receive[d] any pension benefits." 130 CoNo. REc.
13,345 (1984) (statement of Rep. LaFalce).
79. Retirement Equity Act of 1984 § 104(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (d)(3)(A)
(1988). Section 104(a) provides:
Paragraph (1) shall apply to the creation, assignment, or recog-
nition of a right to any benefit payable with respect to a participant
pursuant to a domestic relations order, except that paragraph (1)
shall not apply if the order is determined to be a qualified domestic
relations order.
Id. Paragraph (1) provides: "Each pension plan shall provide that benefits
provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(1) (1988).
80. A qualified domestic relations order is defined as:
a domestic relations order ... which creates or recognizes the
existence of an alternate payee's right to, or assigns to an alternatehttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/5
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"qualified domestic relations order" can require a plan admin-
istrator to pay benefits to someone other than the plan partic-
ipant, such as a former spouse.8 The REA allows state divorce
and separation decrees to distribute pension benefits as long as
the decrees are sufficiently detailed for compliance by the plan
administrator and do not increase the total amount of benefits
distributed by the plan.82
By allowing state law to govern postnuptial distribution of
pension benefits, to some extent, the REA corrected the conflict
between state domestic relations law and ERISA's broad pre-
emption language. 3 Congress preserved the breadth of ERISA's
payee the right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits payable
with respect to a participant under a plan ... which ... relates
to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital
property rights to a spouse, former spouse, or child of a partici-
pant, and ... is made pursuant to State domestic relations law.
REA §§ 104(a)(3)(B)(i), (ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (d)(3)(A) (1988). See also Stinner
v. Stinner, 523 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1987) (denying attachment of pension for
alimony payments because liability had been contractually created and not
court sanctioned) rev'd 554 A.2d 45, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 919 (1989).
81. Technically, ERISA's language prohibiting alienation and assignment
of benefits prevented courts from dividing benefits in divorce proceedings.
Courts avoided this result, however, by finding state laws regarding property
distribution to be applicable and exempt from preemption by ERISA. See
supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text (discussing court treatment of the
conflict between state domestic relations laws and federal pension legislation).
82. To be sufficiently detailed under the REA an order must meet the
following requirements:
(C) A domestic relations order meets the requirements of this
subparagraph only if
(i) the name and the last known mailing address (if any) of the
participant and the name and mailing address of each alternate
payee covered by the order,
(ii) the amount or percentage of the participant's benefits to be
paid by the plan to each such alternate payee, or the manner in
which such amount or percentage is to be determined,
(iii) the number of payments or period to which such order
applies, and;
(iv) each plan to which such order applies.
(D) A domestic relations order meets the requirements of this
subparagraph only if such order -
(i) does not require a plan to provide any type or form of
benefit, or any option, not otherwise provided under the plan,
(ii) does not require the plan to provide increased benefits
(determined on the basis of actuarial value), and
(iii) does not require the payment of benefits to an alternate
payee which are required to be paid to another alternate payee
under another order previously determined to be a qualified do-
mestic relations order.
REA §§ 104(a)(3)(C), (D), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1056(d)(3)(C), (D) (1988).
83. The REA supporters acknowledged the courts' problems with recon-
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preemption clause by creating a narrow exception to federal
preemption for state sanctioned postmarital pension benefit dis-
tribution. Congress chose to carve a narrow statutory exception
to ERISA's preemption language rather than allowing courts to
narrowly interpret ERISA's preemption clause to achieve state
control of postnuptial pension distribution." Thus, the REA
corrected the problems women confronted when, as pensioner's
ex-spouses, they attempted to enforce divorce decrees distribut-
ing pension benefits.
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE WAIVER OF ERISA
BENEFITS
Although the REA enables women to enforce postnuptial
agreements regarding pension benefits, the REA does not pro-
vide similar protection to women entering prenuptial agree-
ments.85 Specifically, people attempting to enforce prenuptial
agreements in which a prospective spouse purports to waive
ERISA benefits have met with varied success. A minority of
courts believe that a spouse's clear intent to waive pension
benefits, as evidenced by a prenuptial agreement, satisfies the
REA's waiver requirements.8 6 The majority of courts, however,
require parties to comply with the REA's explicit waiver require-
ments, making attempts at prenuptial distribution of pension
benefits futile. 7
ciling a pension plan's interests with a former spouse's interests:
[the REA] also deals with the division of retirement benefits in
the case of divorce. In part, problems have arisen in this area
because of uncertainty as to the relationship between Federal and
State law with respect to pension plans. The bill sets minimum
standards of specificity with respect to a domestic relations order
as it relates to a pension benefit. These standards balance the need
of the former spouse for flexibility to provide appropriate support,
and the plan's need for clear rules.
130 CONG. REc. 13,325 (1984)(statement of Rep. Rostenkowski).
"Until REAct, however, enforcement of such claims lacked statutory basis
and required the courts to circumvent both the antialienation rule and the
preemption clause of ERISA." LANGBEiN, PENSIONS, supra note 60, at 378.
84. 130 CONG. Rc. 13,325 (1984) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski).
85. Congress' primary concern in enacting the REA was for current rather
than prospective spouses. "[B]ecause the committee believes that a spouse
should be involved in making choices with respect to retirement income on
which the spouse may also rely, [the REA] requires spousal consent when a
participant elects not to take a survivor benefit." S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong.
2d Sess., 12 (1984) reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547, 2558.
86. See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text (discussing In re Estate
of Hopkins, 574 N.E.2d 230 (IlI. App. Ct.), app. denied, 580 N.E.2d 115 (111.
1991)).
87. See infra notes 96-114 and accompanying text (discussing cases that
hold prenuptial agreements ineffective to waive spousal benefits).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/5
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In In re Estate of Hopkins,88 a plan participant and his
prospective spouse signed a prenuptial agreement stating that
each party would retain his or her own separate property and
have no rights in the other's estate upon death. 9 Prior to
entering the prenuptial agreement, the participant designated his
daughter from a previous marriage as the beneficiary of his
pension plan.90.After the participant died, his widow contended
that she, and not the named beneficiary, should receive the
participant's pension." The court held that the prenuptial agree-
ment waived the widow's rights under the REA to receive the
participant's pension. 2 Relying on Fox Valley & Vincinity Con-
struction Workers Fund v. Brown,93 an earlier Seventh Circuit
decision, the Hopkins court reasoned that although the partici-
pant and his wife failed to comply strictly with the REA's waiver
requirements, they could still waive spousal rights to pension
benefits.Y The court reasoned that the Hopkins' prenuptial
agreement indicated their clear intent to waive pension benefits. 95
Unlike the Hopkins court, most courts find that waiver of
spousal rights to pension benefits requires strict compliance with
the REA's statutory language. In Hurwitz v. Sher,96 the Second
88. 574 N.E.2d 230 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), app. denied, 580 N.E.2d 115 (Il.
1991).
89. Id. at 232.
90. Id. Five years before entering into the prenuptial agreement, the
deceased plan participant provided that if his daughter, the named beneficiary,
was still a minor at the time of his death, the benefits were to be paid to his
sister as trustee for his daughter. Id.
91. Thomas Hopkins' spouse, Nancy Hopkins, relied primarily on the
REA, which was enacted after they signed the prenuptial agreement but before
Thomas died. Id. at 232, 234. Nancy argued that the enactment of the REA
divested Thomas' daughter of her status as the beneficiary of his pension plan
benefits. Id. at 233. Moreover, Nancy argued that the prenuptial agreement
did not waive her automatic right to receive her husband's pension benefits
because that right arose only after she had entered the prenuptial agreement.
Id. Essentially, Nancy argued that she could not waive a right of which she
was not aware.
92. Hopkins, 574 N.E.2d at 234. The court discredited Nancy's arguments
and focused instead on the "clear intent" of the parties as gleaned from the
prenuptial agreement. Id. The court emphasized the agreement's comprehen-
sive, prospective language to conclude that Nancy waived her claim to future
acquired rights. Id.
93. 897 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1990) (en bane), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 820
(1990). The Fox Valley court permitted a distribution of pension funds upon
divorce to the alternate payee in the divorce decree, despite the failure of the
decree to satisfy the requirements of a qualified domestic relations order. Id.
at 280. See supra note 82 and accompanying text for a discussion of qualified
domestic orders.
94. Hopkins, 574 N.E.2d at 235.
95. Id. at 237.
96. 982 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2345 (1993).
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Circuit specifically rejected the Hopkins court's holding and
analysis as contrary to the plain language of the REA. 97 The
plan participant in Hurwitz entered a prenuptial agreement with
his prospective spouse similar to the agreement in Hopkins.98
The participant died nine months after his marriage. 99 The
Hurwitz court held that the prenuptial agreement was not a
waiver of pension benefits because it did not comply with waiver
requirements under the REA.100 The Hurwitz court required
strict adherence to waiver requirements but noted, however, that
Congress probably did not contemplate prenuptial waiver of
pension benefits when it enacted the REA. 10 Reasoning that it
97. Hurwitz, 982 F.2d at 783.
98. Id. at 779.
99. Id. The deceased participant, David Hurwitz, was an attorney and
businessman. Before marrying Sher, he had been married twice. In 1988, he
had his second wife waive benefits under the plan and he designated his son
from his first marriage, Peter, as the beneficiary. Before marrying Sher in
1990, David had her sign an agreement waiving her right to claim any of his
property after his death. Id.
The Hurwitz court criticized the Hopkins court for improperly applying Fox
Valley. The Hurwitz court reasoned that:
Fox Valley addressed the question of whether a divorced spouse
who was designated as a beneficiary prior to divorce may still
receive death benefits despite a waiver provision in a divorce
settlement. A divorced spouse, unlike a current spouse, is not
protected by the explicit terms of the statute. The Seventh Circuit
held, therefore, that a divorced spouse may waive benefits without
following the explicit requirements of the statute. The Hopkins
court erred by applying the same logic to current spouses.
Id. (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 781. In Hurwitz, the court reserved judgment on whether the
agreement would fail if its only defect was that at the time of its execution
the parties were not married so that the "spouse" waiving benefits, was not
yet legally a spouse, thereby failing to meet the waiver requirements. Id. at
781 n.3.
The Hurwitz court also found that the Hopkins court erroneously failed to
give weight to a Treasury Regulation stating that prenuptial agreements are
not effective as waivers to spousal benefits. Id. at 781.
The regulation, although nonbinding, is intended to provide guidance for
interpretation of ERISA because the IRS is one of the agencies responsible
for administering ERISA. The regulation interprets parallel provisions in the
internal revenue code to ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C. 1055 (1988). The regulation
provides: "Q-28: Does consent contained in an antenuptial agreement or
similar contract entered into prior to marriage satisfy the consent requirements
of section 401(a)(11) and 417? A-28: No. An agreement entered into prior to
marriage does not satisfy the applicable consent requirements, even if the
agreement is executed within applicable election period." Treas. Reg. § 1.401
(a)-20 (1988).
101. "[I]t is likely that the Congressional sponsors did not anticipate the
situation at issue here, in which two older, wealthy individuals relied on an
antenuptial agreement to protect their children's inheritances." Hurwitz, 778
F.2d at 781.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/5
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could not "by fiat" disfranchise newlywed widows in order to
benefit the children of previous marriages, 0 2 the Hurwitz court
ignored the participant's desire to have benefits paid to his
son. 103
Other courts refuse to enforce prenuptial agreements because
the parties were not spouses when they entered the agreements.
In Zinn v. Donaldson Co.,1°4 the widow of a deceased plan
participant challenged a prenuptial agreement similar to the one
in the Hurwitz case. 105 The Zinn court concluded that the
agreement did not waive spousal benefits because the participant
and his prospective spouse were not married at the time they
signed the agreement.1 6 Under the Zinn court's analysis, the
participant's fiance was not a "spouse" when she signed the
agreement and was therefore not capable of waiving her bene-
fits.1O7
If courts follow the strict statutory construction used in
Hurwitz'08 and Zinn,1' 9 they will invalidate every agreement
entered into prior to marriage that purports to waive spousal
rights to pension benefits, regardless of the parties' intent.
Proper statutory analysis of ERISA requires the inequitable
results reached by the Zinn and Hurwitz courts." 0 According to
the traditional rules of statutory construction, courts must strictly
construe the waiver requirements."' The plain meaning rule of
102. Id. at 781.
103. The Hurwitz court rejected Peter's argument that it should force Sher
to comply with the unambiguous terms of the agreement because of David's
ambiguous intentions. The court felt it would be inappropriate to "plumb the
decedent's ambiguous intentions when the statutory requirements are so clear."
Id. at 783.
104. 799 F. Supp. 69 (D. Minn. 1992).
105. Id. at 70-71. Donald Zinn, the plan participant, divorced his first wife,
Alice, and married Audrey Petri. Prior to marrying her, Donald had Audrey
sign a waive to claims on his property. Id.
106. Id. at 73.
107. Id.
108. 782 F.2d at 781 (requiring strict compliance with the REA's waiver
rules).
109. 799 F. Supp. at 73 (barring use of a prenuptial agreement to waive
pension benefits because the parties were not spouses).
110. See supra notes 106 and 107 and accompanying text. These courts'
decisions are inequitable for two reasons. First, the courts refused to fulfill
the deceased plan participant's intent. Second, the courts treated prenuptial
and postnuptial agreements differently due to the language of the statute.
These decisions require that the law differently treat substantively identical
agreements executed minutes after rather than minutes before the marriage
ceremony.
111. Because Congress chose for the relevant REA provisions to apply to
a "spouse," Congress excluded all other people. A common rule of statutory
construction provides: "[W]here a form of conduct, the manner of its per-
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statutory construction dictates that the parties to a waiver be
married to fulfill the statute's "spouse" requirement."2 Follow-
ing accepted statutory construction rules, most courts facing this
issue side with the Hurwitz and Zinn courts and discredit the
Hopkins decision."'
The Hurwitz court noted that fulfilling congressional intent
will not necessarily fulfill the participant's intent." 4 This is
especially true in cases involving second marriages. That courts
cannot fulfill participants' clear intent without abandoning ac-
cepted legal principles demonstrates Congress' failure to ade-
quately legislate in this area.'
Because the majority of courts require strict adherence to
waiver requirements, couples using premarital agreements often
attempt new ways to waive benefits by agreement before mar-
riage. Recently, in Callahan v. Hutsell, Callahan & Buchino,16
a participant and his future spouse adjusted their prenuptial
agreement to comply with waiver requirements." 7 The agreement
in Callahan contained a provision requiring the participant's
spouse to execute all necessary documents to waive her spousal
formance and operation, and the persons and things to which it refers are
designated, there is an inference that all omissions should be understood as
exclusions." SINGER, supra note 58 at § 47.23 (1992).
112. Spouse is defined as: "a man or woman joined in wedlock: married
person." WEBSTER's NEW THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2208 (1986).
113. See, e.g., Howard v. Branham & Baker Coal Co., No. 90-00115, 1992
WL 15457 (6th Cir. July 6, 1992) (rendering ineffective deceased plan parti-
cipant's prenuptial agreement stipulating that the parties' assets would not be
affected by the marriage). Hurwitz, 778 F.2d at 781.
114. Congress intended to protect American workers, their spouses, and
their retirement incomes by requiring mandatory spousal and survivor benefits
for qualified plans. For a discussion of congressional intent in the enactment
of ERISA and REA, see supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text. However,
these requirements can frustrate individuals' attempts to plan for retirement
on their own. The statutes restrain those families that make alternate plans
for retirement income security, who often fail to successfully circumvent
statutory defaults.
115. See, e.g., Nellis v. Boeing Co., No. 91-1011-K, 1992 WL 122773, at
*4 (D. Kan. May 8, 1992) ("The court is not unmindful that the application
of these laws and regulations may work a result which is contrary to the
decedent's intent.").
116. Nos. 92-5796, 92-5797, 92-5862, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 34005 (6th
Cir. Dec. 20, 1993).
117. Although there is no indication in the prenuptial agreement that they
were trying to avoid waiver requirements, the parties to the agreement in
Callahan were apparently cognizant of the necessity to contract around the
requirements. The participant's attorney submitted an affidavit swearing that
he had been instructed to include the provisions necessary to effectuate a
waiver. Id. at *6-*7.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/5
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benefits once the couple became legally married."' However,
after the participant's death, the court awarded the benefits to
the spouse because the couple failed to meet the waiver require-
ments of the plan itself." 9 The court did not address the wife's
status as a "spouse" at the time she executed the prenuptial
agreement. The court suggested, however, that a strict reading
of the "spouse" requirement might be inconsistent with other
decisions of the Sixth Circuit. 2° The court refrained from ef-
fectuating the participant's intent through a loose reading of
the waiver requirements because the parties had failed to fulfill
other requirements of their agreement.' 2'
The Callahan court remanded the case so that the lower court
could determine if the participant's spouse had breached her
prenuptial agreement by failing to execute properly the necessary
plan documents to effectuate a waiver.1'2 If, on remand, the
118. Paragraph 15 of the antenuptial agreement said that:
Nancye consented, effective upon marriage, to Ed's election to
waive a qualified joint and survivor annuity form of benefit in
his ERISA plans. Nancye agreed, in this paragraph, that Ed might
designate any beneficiary he desired; acknowledged that she would
not be entitled to a death benefit under the plans; agreed to
execute all further documents requested by Ed to evidence the
consents and waivers contained in the agreement; and "specifically
agreed to execute the attached forms as to Ed's interest in the
Hutsell, Callahan & Buchino, P.S.C. plan and Ed's Individual
Retirement Account as soon as possible after marrying Ed.
Id. at *7.
119. Id. at *15.
120. Callahan, 1993 U.S. App. Lexis 34005 at *17. In its analysis the court
referred to the Sixth Circuit decision in United States v. Honaker, 5 F.3d 160
(6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1226 (1994). The Honaker decision
involved the interpretation of a criminal statute. Honaker hela that in order
to determine the meaning of a particular statute, courts look "not only to
the particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole
and to its object and policy." Honaker, 5 F.3d at 161 (quoting Crandon v.
United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990). By referring to Honaker, the Callahan
court implicitly rejected a strict interpretation of "spouse" as an inaccurate
reading of the REA and as contrary to congressional intent.
121. The court appeared ready to enforce the agreement when it stated:
"The participant in the plan[] was Ed, after all, and it was he whom Congress
intended should be 'master of his own ERISA Plan."' Callahan, 1993 U.S.
App. LEXIS 34005, at *21 (quoting McMillan v. Parrot, 913 F.2d 310, 312
(6th Cir. 1990)).
The dissent urged the court to use its equitable powers and enforce the
agreement as a waiver to benefits because of the clear intent of-the parties to
do so. Callahan, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 34005, at *24 (Gilmore, J., dissenting)
("It appears clear to me that the express provisions of the antenuptial
agreement foreclose any consideration of Nancye's benefiting beyond the terms
of that agreement.").
122. Callahan, 1993 U.S. App. Lexis 34005 at *22.
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Callahan court decides that couples are permitted to circumvent
the specific requirements of REA, control over pension distri-
bution will pass from Congress to plan participants and then
spouses.'2J Attempts to circumvent waiver requirements, like the
attempt in the Callahan case, indicate that ERISA does not
satisfy the needs of pensioners and their spouses. To maintain
as much uniform, federal control as possible while addressing
modern demands, Congress should amend ERISA.
III. PROBLEMS WITH EXISTING LEGISLATION
Congress could easily avoid the problems caused by pension
participants' attempts to defeat E RISA's preemption require-
ments in the prenuptial agreement area by amending ERISA to
allow prenuptial waivers. The Federal Government should re-
spect the states' traditional control of domestic matters and
existing state regulation of premarital agreements. Furthermore,
the existing paternalistic federal regulation of such matters has
complicated financial planning for the modern family.124 There-
fore, just as Congress excepted state regulation of divorce from
ERISA preemption, so too should Congress except state regu-
lation of premarital agreements from ERISA preemption. 2
To comply with the existing legislation, many prospective
spouses use innovative prenuptial agreements to circumvent the
123. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing the congressional
desire for national uniformity in the field of pension regulation).
124. The ERISA waiver requirements are paternalistic because they replace
individual control of financial planning with federal control. Congress achieved
uniform federal control at the expense of simple, individual choice on personal
financial matters. "Ptaternalism presumes that people are unable to understand
their own best interest and require the protection of a benevolent state....
Congress clearly supposes that people are unable to make wise savings decisions
for themselves." Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psycholog-
ical Evidence and Economic Theory, 58 U. Ci. L. REv. 1275, 1276, 1283
(1991) (criticizing the paternalistic federal regulation under ERISA and the
Social Security Act because the statutes are not in accord with economic
theory).
125. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text (discussing the creation
of the qualified domestic relations order exception to the preemption clause).
Similarly, several other federal pension plans have been amended following
inequitable court decisions. For example, the decision in Hisquierdo v. His-
quierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979), which denied division of a Railroad Retirement
Act pension pursuant to a state divorce decree, prompted amendment to the
spousal benefit provisions of the Railroad Retirement Act. See 45 U.S.C.
§ 231a(c)(4) (1988). The benefits now mirror the Social Security Act provisions
providing benefits for certain spouses. See Soc. Sec. Act §§ 201 (b)(1), 292(c)(1),
216 (d), 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b) (1), 402(c)(1), 416(d) (1988). See also, McCarty
v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981) (denying application of state community
property law to divide a military pension, prompted the Former Spouseshttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urb nlaw/vol47/iss1/5
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requirements for a waiver.'26 Creative attorneys are consulted to
draft effective prenuptial agreements, and practitioners' journals
run numerous advice articles for dealing with this complicated
issue. 127 These articles suggest several ways to meet clients'
needs. 28 First, a postmarriage ratification of the premarital
agreement can breathe life into an agreement that was not valid
at the time the parties signed it because they were not
"spouses."' 29 Second, practitioners suggest adding a clause in
the premarital agreement requiring the parties to execute the
necessary documents to designate a beneficiary other than the
participant's spouse. 30 Third, in the event one party fails to
execute such documents, the payee spouse can agree to pay the
benefits over to the intended beneficiary when the payee spouse
receives them.' Finally, couples contemplating marriage may
want to cohabitate instead of legally marrying.132 These attempts
to manipulate distribution prior to marriage appear effective,
but actually have hidden defects.
Forcing plan participants to evade ERISA legislation and
attempt their own distribution of pension benefits can have
Protection Act). See 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1988) (permitting state community
property law application). For additional discussion, see generally LANGBEIN,
PENsIoNs, supra note 60.
126. See, e.g., Callahan v. Hutsell, Callahan & Buchino, Nos. 92-5796, 92-
5797, 92-5862, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 34005, at *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 1993)
(reviewing a prenuptial agreement that required a prospective spouse to sign
a waiver "as soon as possible" after the wedding).
127. See supra notes 113-23 and accompanying text (discussing cases in-
volving attempts to circumvent waiver requirements). See also Louise E.
Graham, Kentucky Law Survey, Domestic Relations, 73 Ky. L.J. 379 (1984)
(examining the pitfalls that practicing attorneys face after the entry of federal
legislation into the field of domestic relations); Kathleen B. Vetrano, Spousal
Waiver of Pension Premaritally and Upon Divorce, FAmsHARm, Sept. 1993,
at 10 (reviewing recent decisions regarding domestic agreements and ERISA
legislation); Jacques T. Schlenger et al., Current Tax Developments: Anten-
uptial Agreement Didn't Waive Surviving Spouse's Right to Retirement Plan
Benefit, 20 EsT. PLAN. 304 (1993) (summarizing Hurwitz v. Sher and advising
practitioners on the decision); Troyan, supra note 22 (alerting the public to
the REA's pitfalls).
128. See, e.g., Lynn Wintriss, Waiver of REA Rights in Premarital Agree-
ments, J. PROB. & PROP. May/June 1993 at 16 (discussing the ineffectiveness
of conventional premarital agreements for waiver of benefits and suggesting
drafting techniques for effective waivers).
129. Id. at 18.
130. Id. at 19.
131. Id.
132. ERISA does not require an unmarried participant to obtain a waiver.
ERISA § 205(c)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2)(B) (1988). See also Michael D.
Rose, Pension Plans: Why Antenuptial Agreements Cannot Relinquish Sur-
vivor Benefits, 43 FLA. L. REv. 723, 735 (1991) (discussing prenuptial agree-
ments' ineffectiveness for waiving pension benefits and suggesting alternative
methods participants could use to achieve their purposes).
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unintended consequences. None of these options has been tested
in the courts 1 3 and it is possible that a court, unhappy with
individuals trying to evade federal law, might disallow these
arrangements. Also, agreements requiring a spouse to pay over
benefits received and the option of cohabitation can have adverse
tax consequences. For example, the spouse accepting benefits as
the plan beneficiary and then paying those benefits over to the
desired beneficiary will be taxed on the amount of benefits
received. 34 Remaining unmarried might also have adverse tax
consequences for couples who cohabitate to affect a desired
pension distribution. Furthermore, in some states cohabitation
may be regarded as common law marriage, thereby frustrating
the attempt to avoid automatic spousal benefits. 35 Finally, the
Internal Revenue Service may disqualify the plan from favorable
tax treatment for attempting to evade Internal Revenue Code
provisions.
Sound social policy also dictates amending ERISA to allow
prenuptial waivers. First, if participants are forced to use alter-
nate ways to distribute pension benefits, only those with good
legal advice will be able to distribute their benefits as desired.
Truly equitable pension legislation should provide the same
options for all plan participants. Second, paternalistic pension
legislation assumes that women and all spouses are not capable
of acting in their own best interest. 36 This assumption, which
Congress uses to justify regulation, is contrary to the accepted
economic theory that people make economic decisions rationally
and in their own best interest.3 7 While the selected paternalistic
approach to pension legislation has helped achieve the goal of
gender equity, it has created other problems for its intended
beneficiaries.
Instead of forcing participants to contract around the REA
waiver requirements, Congress should amend the statute. 38 An
133. For example, in Callahan the court remanded so the trial court could
determine whether the spouse should be bound by her agreement to execute
all necessary waiver documents once she married the plan participant. Callahan,
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 34005, at *22. See supra note 121 and accompanying
text (discussing the Callahan court's decision to remand).
134. Wintriss, supra note 128, at 18. See also Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111
(1930) (holding that income is taxed to the individual who earned it).
135. Rose, supra note 132, at 736.
136. Weiss, supra note 124, at 1276 (discussing Congress' paternalistic
approach to pension policy).
137. Id. (noting that economists presume that rational individuals act in
their own best interests).
138. To make this change, congressional amendment is preferable to court
manipulation of the statutory language, because congressional action gives
broad social policies proper weight and consideration. Congress, not the courts,https:// pen cholarship.wu tl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/5
PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS AND ERISA
amendment would give couples the freedom to plan their finan-
cial futures. Leaving regulation of prenuptial agreements to the
states would not endanger plan participant's spouses because
state laws adequately regulate premarital agreements. 39 Accord-
ingly, Congress should leave regulation of such matters to the
states by excepting them from ERISA preemption.
IV. PROPOSAL TO AMEND ERISA
In order to respect state regulation of prenuptial agreements
and to permit these agreements to effectively distribute pension
benefits, two amendments to ERISA are required. First, Con-
gress must except state laws regarding these agreements from
ERISA preemption.?4 Second, Congress must amend the re-
quirements for the waiver of joint and survivor annuities to
allow for premarital distribution of benefits.' 4' Altering the
language of the waiver requirements will allow courts both to
construe properly the statute and reach an equitable result. 42
First, Congress should amend section 514 (b) as follows:
(8) subsection (a) shall not apply to state laws regu-
lating prenuptial agreements regarding the division of.
marital property.
This change will codify the traditional state control of these
matters. Because these agreements will need to conform to the
relevant state laws, there will be a loss of uniformity in laws
that relate to pensions. However, plan participants will corre-
spondingly gain the freedom to contract prenuptially for finan-
cial planning. Allowing for easier financial planning will help
fulfill another of Congress' goals: respecting marriage as an
"economic partnership.' '43
Second, Congress should amend the requirements for the
waiver of joint and survivor annuity payments. Section 205(c)(2)
should be rewritten as follows:
should identify exceptions to statutory language. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal
Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990) (deciding to approve
an equitable exception to ERISA's assignment and alienation provisions).
139. See supra notes 48-61 and accompanying text (discussing state regula-
tion of domestic relation matters).
140. See supra part I.B (discussing ERISA preemption).
141. See supra notes 74-79 (reviewing ERISA waiver requirements).
142. The Internal Revenue Code and corresponding Treasury Regulations
will need similar changes. See 26 U.S.C. § 417(a) (1988) (relating to waivers
of spousal benefits).
143. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining congressional
recognition of marriage as an economic partnership).
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Each plan shall provide that an election under par-
agraph (1)(A)(i) shall not take effect -
(A) unless the spouse of the participant or the
prospective spouse, in the case of a premarital agree-
ment, consents in writing to such election, (i) such
election designates a beneficiary or in the event that
a beneficiary is not named in the consent document,
the beneficiary designated in the plan documents will
control and (ii) the spouse's consent acknowledges the
effect of such election and is witnessed by a plan
representative or a notary public.
The italicized language corrects the potential problems of couples
trying to waive their pension benefits premaritally. The amend-
ment modifies the requirement that a "spouse" actually waive
the benefits by allowing for a prospective spouse to waive
benefits in the case of a premarital agreement. This modification
allows courts to properly construe the statutory language and
still fulfill the participant's intent. The other modification pro-
vides a default provision for those premarital agreements that
fail to designate a beneficiary. Instead of voiding an agreement
for its lack of a designated beneficiary, the statute fulfills the
participant's intent by requiring benefit payment to the benefi-
ciary noted in the plan documents. These changes in the re-
quirements for waiver will cure the technical defects that many
premarital agreements suffer under the present statutory scheme.
Fulfilling Congress' primary goal of ensuring the retirement
income security of American workers and their families is best
achieved with an amendment to ERISA. Congressional provi-
sions that mandate pension savings do not always coincide with
the retirement savings choices of American families. These pro-
posed amendments preserve the congressionally mandated joint
and survivor annuity benefits as default provisions, insuring that
all wives of pensioners are cared for in retirement. However,
the additional language permitting prenuptial waiver for those
agreements that satisfy state law, provides flexibility in financial
planning and broadens the class of people benefitted by pension
regulation to include dependents and families. These modifica-
tions are not burdensome to the plan administrators and can
assist in fulfilling a participant's intent.' 44
VI. CONCLUSION
Just as the REA's provisions allowing for pension benefits to
be distributed pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order
144. The legislative history of the REA indicates that Congress was reluctant
to create provisions that are overly burdensome to plan administrators. 130
CONG. R c. 13,325 (1984) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/5
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corrected the inequities resulting from the clash of ERISA with
state postnuptial laws, so too can an amendment dealing with
prenuptial matters solve inequities caused by ERISA. The qual-
ified domestic relations order exception to ERISA's preemption
and assignment provisions can serve as a model for amending
the statute to deal with prenuptial matters. Although the amend-
ment would prevent uniform federal regulation, the correspond-
ing gain for women and families would help fulfill the intent
of the REA. Because states already have statutes that only allow
enforcement of fair agreements, federal pension legislation is
unnecessary to protect plan participants and their spouses. Al-
lowing women and their spouses to contract premaritally re-
garding distribution of plan benefits provides security on which
competent couples, as economic partners, can rely.
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